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Religion, Society, Theory
Jean Comaroff
I grew up in apartheid South Africa, on the sort of colonial frontier that puts 
established categories at risk. Religion was one of them. Some argue that the 
separation of the sacred from the secular is a founding principle of liberal modern states 
(Asad 2003:13). But South Africa was a flagrant exception. There, the line between faith 
and politics was always tentative, always contested,  always palpably porous. Faith-
based arguments, there, were central to politics at their most pragmatic, to competing 
claims of sovereignty and citizenship, to debates about the nature of civilization or the 
content of school curricula. As a settler-colony, South Africa had long experimented with 
ways to ‘modernize racial domination’ (Adam 1971) in the interests of capitalist 
production, frequently with appeals to theology. After 1948, in contrast with the spirit of a 
decolonizing world, the country fell under the sway of Afrikaner rulers of overtly Calvinist 
bent, who set about formalizing a racial division of labor that ensured that black 
populations, the Children of Ham, remained economically subservient and politically 
excluded.
The liberal Jewish community in which I was raised included refugees from the 
Holocaust, and was a distinctly nervous fraction of the dominant class  (Bourdieu 
1984:186). Its members were white, but not of the herrenvolk, and acutely alive to the 
perils of racial persecution. Torn between keeping their heads down and voicing moral 
protest, many found solace in the call of another Zion, in a strong identification with the State of Israel that, in 1948, established itself as ethno-nation on the geopolitical world 
map. But South Africa had also spawned other visions of a Promised Land,1 other 
images of Zion, other millennial aspirations that would color my understanding of 
religion and society. While I was schooled in a system dubbed Christian National 
Education (Davies1978), my consciousness was suffused, from early on, by competing 
political-theologies: by a vibrant brace of liberation movements, for instance, in which 
evangelical revival confronted – not always peaceably – European socialist thought and 
New World critiques rooted in the writings of DuBois, Garvey, and Fanon. 
Such a world predisposes one, if not to scepticism about any claim to sovereign 
truth, at least to an acute awareness of the context-dependence of all orders of faith and 
knowledge. It also fosters distrust of the evolutionary conceits of Western modernity – 
among them, that secularism advances steadily as enchantment declines – and of the 
idea that religion is everywhere identifiable as that which pertains to the divine or the 
supernatural.  For what can, or cannot, claim to be “religion” (as against heresy, 
superstition, magic, Satanic rite), and who is or is not authorized to decide, has long 
been a domain of conflict. And an idiom of establishing hegemony. Early European 
settlers and evangelists, some of them denounced as heretics at home, often deemed 
Africans to be devoid of all trace of religion, finding no ready counterpart for their own 
idea of faith among peoples who had no term for ‘religion’ or ‘belief;’ peoples whose 
word for “spirit” (moya, “breath” in Setswana) albeit an echo of Old Testament usage, 
remained irretrievably corporeal in conception. Colonial missions labored hard to instil a 
Protestant ontology – and the mercantile geist it bore – in African consciousness. But the dialectic set in motion between European and African religiosity would yield 
unforeseen mutations, blurring Cartesian divides, queering reigning creeds, calling new 
revelations into being. In the process, Christianity was Africanized, and Africa 
Christianized, distilling novel self-awareness on all sides, not least of the ways in which, 
as Asad (1993:123) has put it, “power create[s] religion;” also, of the ways in which 
religion creates power – and of how people might act upon that awareness, both as 
colonizer and colonized.
All this made it plain to me that, while the category of religion was irredeemably 
relative, in the Euro-modern world at least, a Judeo-Christian definition of the concept 
was hegemonic – not only in theological orthodoxy and public culture, but in much 
scholarly analysis as well. In contrast to some anthropologists (e.g. Bloch 2010), these 
evident facts do not lead me to conclude that no viable theory about religion is possible; 
that we would do best to free ourselves of the term as analytical category in favor of a 
putatively more universal one, like “ritual.” For me, it is precisely the inescapable 
embeddedness of religion in particular social-historical formations that is the point fo 
departure  for useful critical investigation.
Of course, it is all a matter of what one takes to be “theory,” what one 
understands as its objects and objectives. For Bloch (2010:5), to be worthy of its name, 
theory must contribute to “to the general understanding of what kind of animals human 
beings are.” Ritual is more useful than religion in this regard, he argues, because, it can 
be “described as a specific type of modification of the way human beings 
communicate”(Bloch 2010:8), this on the basis of universal cognitive qualities of human existence.2 Religion, by contrast, is not a “natural kind.” Its definition remains socially 
and historically arbitrary. As will be clear, my understanding of theory and its uses in 
relation to religion, or any other aspect of the social world, is rather different. I am not 
primarily interested in identifying “natural” kinds, or establishing “general claims about 
human beings” (Bloch 2010:5) that presume a transcendent vantage. My ethnographic 
training has reinforced my predisposition to see all categories of human thought and 
being – including analytical terms like ritual, which I deploy a great deal in my work – as 
inflected by specific systems of meaning and signification. In this sense, I am interested 
less in theories of religion, than in theories of religion and society. It is precisely the 
nature of this relationship and its historically-specific transformations that fascinate me; 
most specifically, its modern transformations, for those are the ones that our 
epistemological apparatus engages most effectively, at least in the human sciences (cf. 
Casanova 2011). What, with twenty-first century hindsight, is the sustained relationship 
between the Protestant ethic and the nature of capitalism – not to mention the nature of 
‘modernity’ itself? The terms of human knowing and acting are never simply determined, 
once and for all, by genealogy or context. Neither are they unchanging, or without 
contradiction and incoherence. 
For me, useful social analysis is that which strives, within those limits, to gain 
reflexive purchase, from a distinct disciplinary location, on particular phenomena of 
varying scale, generality, and temporality. In my earlier work, for instance, I interrogated 
the ironic role of evangelical Protestantism as vehicle both of the colonization, and the 
emancipation of southern African peoples. I did so both as an anthropologist and as a person from the South, one especially sensitive to the fact that European religiosity was 
embedded in a particular hegemonic order of social, textual, and material relations; 
aware, too, that this ostensibly universal faith was saturated with specific sensibilities 
and values whose implications were profoundly worldly – and central to imperial efforts 
to transform African societies and economies whole cloth. The interplay that ensued 
would significantly refashion the European Christian legacy.3 In the process, the 
ethnocentrism of the latter, and also its ideological role, were often made apparent, 
raising new sensibilities and prompting anguished debate – among scholars, politicians, 
churchmen, and a host of new, independent movements – as to who should be deemed 
Christian. And how the official line should be drawn between church and sect, 
enlightened belief and primitive mentality. As this suggests, the role of religion was of 
signal importance in to the modern colonial project tout court, as  the necessary 
“supplement” (Derrida 1976) to secular discourses of reason, civilization, race.
 This approach implies a vision of grounded theory in which lived practice – 
including self-conscious theory-making itself – is always seen to exist in a dynamic 
relation with immediate context and with larger-scale processes of transformation; in 
which tangible facts, the concrete, cannot be understood without recourse to 
abstraction, to theory, and vice versa. This also implies reflexive critique: a concern not 
merely with how social worlds are constituted, but how they might conceivably have 
been different, and how their present give might give rise to better futures (Horkheimer 
1972). This impetus allies me with analytical approaches produced on other 
authoritarian frontiers – with the kind of immanent critique developed by the Frankfurt School, for instance, which probes contradictions, differentiations and paradoxes in the 
constitution of given worlds, thus to estrange their ruling assumptions, and to envisage 
other, emancipatory possibilities.
Anthropology and its Spirits of Resistance
One such critical engagement, for me, was with the self-imposed limitations of 
the ethnographic tradition in which I was trained at the London School of Economcs in 
the late 1960's. While the wider world around us was seething with the onset of an 
already late capitalist, postcolonial moment, British anthropology remained committed, 
for the most part, to presentist models of small-scale, non-Western polities, still clinging 
to the possibility of accessing the totality of relations of a society, the essential workings 
of  a culture, in any one place and time (cf. Gupta and Ferguson 1997). To be sure, 
there were more advantages to this approach than is often acknowledged these days, 
not least its facilitation of bold theory-making (Comaroff and Comaroff 2012). But the 
sprawling Tswana-speaking ‘homeland’ that confronted me as a neophyte fieldworker in 
the days of high apartheid simply could not be reduced, either ethically or 
methodologically, to a bounded, self-reproducing “society” or clutch of “villages.” Neither 
could the ever-evolving Zionist churches – whose prophet leaders so captured local 
imaginations – be readily described as a “traditional” religions. How, then, to 
acknowledge, in the particularity of the local, forces of “awkward,” translocal scale, 
forces whose historical sociology demanded attention in an age that seemed...post-
anthropological (Comaroff and Comaroff 2003)? 
It was with this task that I wrestled in Body of Power, Spirit of Resistence (1985).  These overtly syncretic religious movements provided the most sustained, emotionally-
compelling focus in the lives of depleted rural communities on the periphery of the 
South African industrial economy, where they served as its racialized, reserve army of 
labor. The product both of secession from the colonial missions and of offshoots of late 
nineteenth-century American revival, these churches, being sites of mimesis and 
refusal, bore witness to the forces that had shaped this local world. Wielding the 
creative power of signs, they made the gospel speak of this-worldly redemption, 
providing a moral lingua franca for a new society of colonized workers and of African 
nationalist struggle. In seeking to expand my ethnographic gaze to encompass the 
multi-scalar forces at play in this creative enterprise, I grafted Weber’s sense of the 
Protestant Ethic onto Durkheim’s view of the pragmatic power of ritual, and deployed 
both in a reading of reading of imperialism and race-class formation inspired by Marx. In 
so doing, I strove to demonstrate something especially evident to those raised in the 
global South: the role of religion, in the profane business of building, and surviving, 
markets and empires.
This work drew lively responses, and various strains of critique, some directed at 
my blatant eclecticism, some uneasy with my readiness to juxtapose “experience-near” 
ethnography with “inaccessible” theoretical abstraction. Anthropology has always had a 
strongly empiricist strain, of course, although our founding fathers were more ready to 
posit bold hypotheses about society and culture than many of their late-modern heirs 
(Comaroff and Comaroff 2012) –  of which more in a moment. A few commentators 
expressed discomfort with what they saw as an over-readiness to dwell on the social and material aspects of religion at the expense of its spiritual dimensions. Some  raised 
this same point in response to Of Revelation and Revolution, the two-volume study I 
undertook with John Comaroff in the 1990's, which explored the relationship of religion 
to colonialism by returning to the ‘long conversation’ between British Nonconformist 
missionaries and the Southern Tswana peoples. Concerned to pursue the implications 
of this case for a more general understanding of historical agency – the missionaries 
were, after all, self-conscious ‘agents, not just of God’s Kingdom, but also of a 
‘revolution’ of hearts and minds – the study sought also to rethink the concept of culture 
in relation to the concepts of hegemony, and ideology. And it aimed to do so by way of 
grounded theory, by training an ethnographic eye on those who seeded a state of 
colonialism from which the colonial state took root: the churchmen, merchants, and 
politicians who were the cultural foot-soldiers of empire. This historical anthropology 
required some experiments in methodology: like assembling an archive that went 
beyond conventional texts to include objects and archaeological remains, objects that 
bore witness to the practices that built the substance of a colonial world. Why were 
trivial commodities so central to the larger spiritual design of God’s agents? Why should 
paper, indigo print, or starched church uniforms have taken on almost magical salience 
on all sides of the nineteenth century frontier? How did window glass, or the 
replacement of round dwellings with a square ones, come to index the advance the 
civilization for its champions? And how did the fetishism of these objects expand 
imperial commodity markets, and link neophyte proletariats in Africa to workers in 
Liverpool and Manchester?Again, these studies evoked lively commentary, some of it echoing the point that 
we stressed the worldly, rather than the sacral, dimension of religious phenomena. To 
which our response has been that this division itself is of more moment to the Cartesian 
sensibilities of our critics than the bulk of the subjects on whom we focus, although, of 
course, the latter are hardly devoid of devotional significance. A fact that we 
endeavored, repeatedly, to convey. Our intention has never been to present a reified 
analysis of “religion as a cultural system” (Geertz 1973), sans its social and material 
grounding in the context that gives it life. Besides, it was the enigmatic role of religion in 
the making of global modernity that was our explicit concern in this project, a choice that 
neither denies the value of the “religious,” narrowly conceived, nor seeks to eclipse its 
value as worthy of study in itself. Some critics also remain unnerved by our play 
between scales of analysis, our readiness to identify the presence of large, reifying 
process – the rationalizing effects of colonial law and literacy, or of proletarianization 
and the growth of commodity markets – on local African landscapes. Many current 
anthropologists are strongly committed to the study of local loyalties and systems of 
knowledge “in their own terms.” And, at least in print, to defend the resilience of these 
systems in the face of global forces besetting “little guys” all over map (Graeber 
2002:1223). As Appadurai (1997:115) has noted, this anxiety reveals a fear of a loss of 
the social intimacy that has long been the ethnographers stock-in-trade; a fear, also, of 
a loss disciplinary distinctiveness as these same “little guys” are ever more deeply 
enmeshed in wider worlds. 
Zombies and the Violence of AbstractionI myself have never been unduly concerned that the anthropological craft was 
under threat, or that the world to which it bore witness was tragically on the wane. 
“Primitive” societies, as we all now know, were never the independent isolates they 
were made to be in much classic ethnography. What is more, the discipline has always 
drawn on theory from the broader human sciences (from biology to political philosophy, 
psychoanalysis to linguistics) thus to “scale up,” to situate its ethnographic cameos 
within the wider social, political and economic force-forces and the structural relations 
that configure them. What remains distinctive about anthropology is its commitment to 
the role of local meaning and modes of practice in shaping human activity; and its 
preoccupation with the interplay of subjective value and objective conditions – however 
complex, labyrinthian, dauntingly ‘global’ these might be. We respect the fact that our 
subjects, like we ourselves, seek ways of interpreting the world, ways of engaging the 
conditions of their being. And, as theorists as varied and Emile Durkheim (1976:277) 
and Walter Benjamin (1968: 253ff) would have predicted, in the face of “fragmentary 
realities,” the quest for meaningful practice readily finds a mystical, even a messianic, 
“impetus to action.” 
The ethnographer’s ‘ear to the ground’ makes her sensitive to these shifts in 
hermeneutic register – not least, in registers of religious imagination and their intimate 
entanglement with the challenge of ordinary life. Take the matter of zombies: when John 
Comaroff and I returned to South Africa after the end of apartheid, we had the promise 
of new-found freedoms on our minds. The last thing we expected to encounter in the 
rural communities I knew best was an epidemic anxiety about the living-dead. Yet there could be no denying this preoccupation, not only in Tswana communities, but elsewhere 
in South Africa as well. Far from exotic tales from the backwoods, the presence of 
zombies was widely discussed in popular culture. Respectable local newspapers carried 
banner headlines proclaiming "`Zombie' Back From The Dead;”4 defense lawyers in 
provincial courts argued that their clients had been driven to murder by the 
zombification of their kin;5 and illicit zombie workers were named in formal labor 
disputes.6 In 1995, the Commission of Inquiry into Witchcraft Violence and Ritual 
Murders (Ralushai et al. 1996:5), appointed by the Northern Province administration to 
investigate an "epidemic" of occult violence, reported widespread fear of the figure of 
the zombie – “a person who is believed to have died, but because of the power of a 
witch,...is resurrected...[and] works for [him/her].”
While witchcraft has long been integral to Tswana thought, zombies have not. I 
was struck by the particular features attributed to these specters in vernacular parliance: 
zombies – the common term here is diphoko, from the Afrikaans spook, or ghost – were 
spoken about on the street, in private backyards, and in churches. But their mention 
was almost invariably related to another prevalent concern: the disappearance of work, 
this amidst radical shifts in the post-apartheid economy under the impact of policies of 
liberalization. In optimistic policy-speak, the situation was termed “jobless growth.” We 
found the discursive splicing here suggestive: long-standing conceptions of witchcraft, 
boloi, had come to embrace zombie-making, the brutal reduction of others to 
instruments of production; to insensate beings stored, it was said, ‘like tools’ in sheds, cupboards, or oil drums of their creators -- the latter usually, if not inevitably, people of 
conspicuous new wealth, whose source was not readily explicable (cf. Ralushai et al. 
1996:50). In a world of flexitime employment, it was even said that some were made 
into "part-time zombies" (ibid:224-5), whose exhaustion in the morning spoke of 
involuntary toil on the night shift.
How to make sense of the poetics of this local nightmare, one that seemed to be 
haunting widening sectors of the national population? If ever there was a figure that 
typified the sudden rise of joblessness, the mysterious production of wealth without 
work, and the apparently occult grounding of neoliberal capitalism in local experience, it 
was the zombie. A creature of  "estranged recognition" in perplexing times (Clery 
1995:114) s/he was all surplus value, no costly human needs. This kaleidoscopic figure, 
the ultimate embodiment of flexible, “non-standard,” asocial labor was not 
unprecedented, of course: it comes to us in a range of ethnographic, historical, and 
literary accounts from Africa and the New World that point both to subtle differences and 
to noncoincidental similarities. Zombies appear simultaneously translocal and local, 
simultaneously planetary and – refracted through the shards of vernacular cultural 
practices –  profoundly parochial, just as they appeared, long ago, on the plantations 
and in the mines of far-flung colonies. 
As has been noted before, our concerns here were not, in the first instance, 
theoretical or conceptual.7 We came across the zombie through an empirical 
conjuncture: it was the force of historical fact, rather than abstract analytical interest, 
that compelled us to make sense of them in situ. But by what ethnographic means does one comprehend human musings on the visceral experience of personal devaluation, 
both as moral being and as labor power? How to capture a world in which “jobless 
growth” appears as the mystical capacity of some to thrive on the lifeblood of others? 
How does one make sense, in other words, of new religious and social movements that 
accompany radical change in conditions under which people must produce and 
reproduce their lives and their self-worth? These are not matters that can simply be 
proven by empirical means, although attention to the texture of local discourse certainly 
takes one some of the way (cf. Comaroff and Comaroff 1999b). Zombies bespeak 
intimate community frictions. But they also register the impact on these local worlds of 
larger forces at once palpable yet opaque, of the violent abstraction that has withdrawn 
capital – lifeblood –  from what once were viable modes of production to invest it 
elsewhere; away from workers with contracts to cheaper, casualized labor, to machines, 
to offshore production. When first we lived in the rural, Tswana-speaking north-west, 
upwards of 80% of all men spent a sizable proportion of their lives in the migrant 
economy. By the mid 1990's, that figure had dropped to below 15%. Grasping the 
impetus behind such radical transformation requires an act of “inspired guess-
work” (Leach 1961:5), both by the organic thinkers that live the effects and by those 
seeking to understand their situation. What is required is the courage – some would say, 
the fool-hardiness – to move between the concrete and the concept, poetics and 
political- economy, to hypothesize about the working of large-scale abstractions so as to 
posit their relationship to the grounded realities that meet our gaze.
One must be prepared to bear the risks of the ‘sociological imagination” (Mills 1959). As with some of my earlier work, the accounts of these transformations – of the 
culture of neoliberalism and of what John Comaroff and I have termed “occult 
economies” (1999a) and “millennial capitalism” (2000) – have drawn both rich 
engagement and robust critique. Much of the latter was concerned, once again, with our 
readiness to link religion to political economy, local life to large-scale forces (Moore 
1999), ethnographic methods to what one pair of critics termed the “meta-narrative of 
modernity” – phrased by them in such a way as to sound suspiciously like a synonym 
for “Theory” in the upper case (Englund and Leach 2000). The latter, they claim, 
“undermine(s)...what is unique in the ethnographic method – its reflexivity, which gives 
subjects authority in determining the context of their beliefs and practices” (p.225). This 
objection is at once myopic and irresponsible (Comaroff and Comaroff 2003); it both 
over-values the role of academic analysis and underrates the impact of structural forces 
on “local worlds.” Local beliefs and practices do not exist in zero-sum relation with 
macro-forces of modernity. As we, and others, have shown repeatedly, they exist in 
complex dialectic, a shifting interplay, which itself determines the nature of what is taken 
to be“local” and/or translocal in the first place  (This, pace the critique on the part of 
some otherwise insightful writers, like Marshall [2009:24-5] who seems carelessly to 
misread us on this point; cf Geschiere below). To be sure, how and what is “local,” how 
and in what proportion it is situated in worlds beyond itself, is a constant challenge to 
anthropology. After all, it is world historical processes, like the marginalization of 
communities I describe above, that threaten the authority of local subjects to determine 
the context of their beliefs and practices – not the proclivities or activities of social 
theorists. Certainly, those impacted by the kinds of job loss we witnessed in South Africa made their own narrative accounts of this epidemic fully audible. And in an idiom very 
much their own. In our effort to understand their situation, to locate it in our ever-more-
interdependent world, why would one not draw on the Theory – the “meta-narratives of 
modernity,” if you will – provided by foundational thinkers concerned with the long 
history of global interdependence; that is, on the likes of Durkeheim, Marx, and Weber. 
The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Late Capitalism
In fact, in order to understand the late modern world – including changes within it 
of the meaning and status of “religion” –  my most recent work has returned to precisely 
the kinds of questions that animated these founding social thinkers. Weber might have 
been right about many things in this respect, but he could not have been more wrong in 
his conviction that, as capitalism has matured, the Protestant ethic would cease to be 
necessary as its ideological impetus. And that enchantment would wither away. 
Notwithstanding the universal impact of secular rationalization, the line between sacred 
and secular was never thoroughgoing, save perhaps at the level of ideology, either 
within European polities or beyond them. In  late modern times, that line has become 
ever more overtly contested, ever more challenged by social and religious movements – 
Christian, Muslim, Jewish, and Hindu alike – that often look less like modern voluntary 
associations than would-be theocracies: communities at once religious, commercial, 
and political, governed by divinely inspiration and reformist zeal. Why should this be?,
Elsewhere, John Comaroff and I (2000) have argued that the late twentieth 
century underwent the kind of radical social, economic, and territorial reorganization –  
akin to that of the Age of Revolution of 1789 - 1848, which ushered in the social and political architecture of the modern world and erected the conceptual scaffolding of 
modern social science. The second age of revolution, we suggested, is witnessing 
another epochal shift in relations among capital, labor, and geo-political organization. 
The sources of this transformation are complex, of course, linked to the ever more 
integrated nature of global capital, especially, finance capital; to the salience of ever 
more abstract, electronically-mediated means of production; to the increasing 
commodification of culture, services, and affect; to the rise of new kinds of accumulation 
vested in knowledge, franchises, brands, intellectual property, and so on. These non-
proletarian modes of production have dramatically eclipsed the ideological role of labor, 
in its modern, industrial form, as the recognized basis of generating value both abstract 
and embodied,  (a fact made poignantly manifest by the figure of the zombie). In 
addition, the sociology of primary production has been reorganized as the quest for 
cheap, tractable labor has eroded existing bases of industrial manufacture and 
globalized the division of labor, a process that has been abetted by the growing 
liberation of corporate enterprise from state regulation. As sites of manufacture and 
consumption have been dispersed across the earth – America’s working class is ever 
more to be found in Asia, or eastern Europe, for example – connections among these 
sites and populations have become fragmented and opaque, undermining the very idea 
of a national economy, in which local interest groups recognize each other as 
interdependent components of a commonweal (Comaroff and Comaroff 2000).
In the upshot, the spatial articulation of politics and economy has been 
fundamentally disrupted, and footloose capital has renegotiated the terms of its relation to the nation-state, itself ever more corporate. Governments have had to make new 
kinds of accommodation with business and with translocal market forces, striking novel 
power-sharing partnerships with private enterprise, both local and foreign. Ruling 
regimes have tended to outsource key state functions, from customs and excise to 
prisons and warfare, rendering borders ambiguously both open (to trade, investment, 
and favored populations) and closed (to immigrants of less desirable quality). Under 
these conditions, sovereignty is often blurred or overlapping. And ever more intense, 
disarticulated flows of bodies, goods, and fiscal media link local units in convoluted 
circuits of exchange that governments are unwilling or unable to regulate. This, in turn, 
undermines the experience of a cohesive political or moral community, contained by the 
common space-time of the nation.8 The growth of these transnational circuits also 
disrupts the modern idea of “society,” which has presumed the same national-territorial 
architecture, the same integrity of organization. The disparate horizons mapped by the 
rapid expansion of deregulated exchange multiply the bases of popular belonging, 
calling upon people to reconsider the once axiomatic attachments to nation and 
community. Representation, at once socio-political and semiotic and sociopolitical, is 
destabilized by these shifts. People loose trust not merely in those who represent their 
interests, but also in the coinage of public communication itself – and in the face-value 
of signs. This distrust is heightened, in many places, by the radical devaluation of key 
media of value, like national currencies. There is a widespread perception, post Bretton 
Woods, that the real worth of money is inconstant, that the relation between signs and 
meanings is slippery. Note, in this regard, that the Tea Party movement in the US has expressed the desire to return to the gold standard, as if this might stabilize national 
tender and value tout court.9
Revitalized religious movements seem especially capable of finding a foothold on 
such unsettled terrain (Comaroff 2008; 2009). This raises a key theoretical question for 
contemporary social analysis: why do faith-based organizations thrive in many contexts 
where the architecture of modern social institutions, institutions a la Durkheim and 
Weber, seems to be eroding? Why are these movements so vibrant when prior forms of 
organization, like labor unions or more orthodox religious denominations, have 
weakened; where the solid lines between the sacred and profane, the private and public 
– lines that seem synonymous with liberal modernity – are under attack in many places. 
I think here of the world-wide evidence of the rapid growth of Pentecostalism and 
related "renewalist" or "spirit-filled" movements, above all in the global South, where 
these movements are “reshaping the social, political and economic landscape”10 by 
engaging in mainstream politics, business, and civic life with the express aim of putting 
“God-in-everything,” so “anything-can-be-holy.”11 Born-again belief, I stress, is not an 
autonomic responses to “neoliberal” transformation. Revitalized faith has often run 
ahead of neoliberalism, bearing the aspirations, the visions of a this-worldly millennium, 
that prepare the ground for radical, market-oriented reform. This raises an historical 
Weberian question about the relationship between the “neo-Protestant” Ethic (often 
linked to a ‘prosperity gospel,’ with faith in ‘Jesus and the market’ [Kintz 1997])  and a 
millennial spirit of capital in our own Age of Transformation.What this suggests, once again, is that we inhabit a moment that raises, if in new 
guise, many of the founding questions of the social sciences, questions first posed by 
the rise of modern society within the framework of liberal democracy, industrial 
capitalism, and the nation-state. Now, as older maps are socio-political space are over 
written by a global division of labor, a planetary economy, and a virtual electronic 
commons, how do social groups organize themselves and their processes of social and 
moral reproduction? What undergirds authority now that sovereign forces are blurred, 
undermined, displaced? What defines human worth as shifts in the nature of work, and 
in the production of value, suddenly render large sectors of the population irrelevant, 
incapable of self-sustenance, disposable – as they did with the rise of the modern 
industrial world, which bred its army of own predatory specters (Thomas 1971)? Are 
radically different forms of mutuality, of emancipatory politics, made possibile by new 
communicative media? Or are the latter merely novel vehicles for long-standing social 
and moral processes? Are new kinds of effervescence evoked by televangelicals and 
cyber-congregations, when messages can be emailed to the Wailing Wall c/o 
www.Email-God.org? Or does mystery get lost in the wiring, the graft, the infinite loops 
of the virtual social network?
Certainly, ours is not the spiritless age that rationalist theorists of modernization 
predicted. Faith, whatever we make of it, is born-again in late modern times. For Adorno 
(1981:95) “phantasmagoria comes into being when, under the constraints of its own 
limitations, modernity's latest products come close to the archaic.” In one guise or 
another, religion remains, remaking itself as the domain in which temporal sovereignty 
gives way, inevitably,  to an authority of a radically different kind. Destined ever to “run ahead” of prevailing forms of human reason, as Durkheim foresaw, faith exists in 
mutually constitutive relation with society. It is its necessary other, as it were, whether to 
legitimize established arrangements or to wield its revelatory force, its otherworldly 
legitimacy, in order to ‘speak truth to power.’ For the social scientist at least, our 
concerns must lie precisely in this dialectical relationship: in the endless, reciprocal 
interplay of religion and society, in its restless historical permutations. 
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